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he Scottish government published on December 20th a detailed White Paper on “Scotland’s 
Place in Europe”, in which it sets out a hierarchy of priorities. Scotland knows what it wants, 
and says so in considerable depth over a hierarchy of options.  
As the Scottish first minister, Nicola Sturgeon, says in her foreword: “On 23 June, the people of 
Scotland voted categorically and decisively to remain within the European Union (EU).” They did so by 
a huge margin (62-38), which is about eight times as decisive as the UK’s overall majority (52-48) to 
leave.  
The first minister’s foreword also states her view that “.... the best option is to become a full member 
of the EU as an independent country. … The Scottish Government was elected in May on a manifesto, 
which said in relation to independence: The Scottish Parliament should have the right to hold another 
referendum […] if there is a significant and material change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014, 
such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against our will.”  
The paper goes on to address in detail two options for the Brexit case.  
First, Scotland advocates that the whole of the UK should stay in the single market and customs union. 
This would be a Norway+Turkey option, joining the European Economic Area, and adding to it 
continued membership of the EU’s customs union.  
Second, if the UK goes for a lesser agreement with the EU, Scotland would seek continued access to 
the single market for itself, with the further devolution of powers necessary to do this.  
The first option is easy to specify, since the EEA and customs union both exist and function. Scotland 
does not have to invent anything here. Instead the paper analyses at length why in its view 
membership of the single market and customs union is beneficial to the Scottish economy and society. 
It unambiguously supports continued free movement of people: “We need the inward flow of people 
not just to support the growth of our businesses and services, but to provide diversity and vibrancy to 
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our communities. Over the next 10 years, 90% of our population growth is projected to come from 
migration. Any move which limits migration, whether from within or beyond the EU, has the potential 
to seriously harm Scotland’s economy.”  
The second option, with Scotland to obtain a ‘differentiated solution’, required much more original 
and exploratory thinking. It consists essentially of Scotland retaining full membership of the single 
market through an agreement with EFTA-EEA, while the rest of the UK abandons the EEA. Scotland in 
this case, however, would not seek to stay in the customs union. The paper acknowledges that this 
option “raises technical, legal and political complexities and challenges”, which it discusses in detail.  
The first standard objection to this proposal is that EFTA-EEA membership is only for ‘states’. To this 
objection, the paper responds by citing that when in the EU there are special cases or circumstances, 
solutions can be arranged legally (‘where there’s a will there’s a way’). Indeed the EU and its member 
states have a considerable number of special arrangements regarding the territorial definition of who 
is ‘in’ the EU or otherwise covered by EU or EEA law, including Gibraltar, the Channel Islands, 
Greenland, Svalbard and the Faroe Islands. The Faroe Islands case is given special attention because it 
is asserted here that Denmark envisages being a ‘sponsor’ for the Faroes to join EFTA as a sub-state 
entity. More generally the paper calls for a ‘flexible Brexit’, echoing the UK’s advocacy in the pre-
referendum debates for a ‘flexible EU’. 
The paper next takes a comprehensive look at how continued membership of the single market for 
Scotland without the rest of the UK might affect the attribution of legislative competences devolved 
to Scotland, and various requirements for these to be extended. For this purpose, three categories of 
competences are identified: 
a) EU competences in already devolved areas. When the UK would, under the Great Repeal Bill, 
repatriate to UK jurisdiction EU law that are in areas of the devolved competences, these 
would be matters for the Scottish Parliament, failing which there would be an unacceptable 
‘re-centralisation’ of powers to London. This concerns agriculture, fisheries, environment, civil 
law, aspects of criminal law, health and higher education and research. 
b) Other repatriated competences. This concerns competences being repatriated where Scotland 
would want to protect certain citizens’ rights, and where it does not already have devolved 
competence. This would concern employment law, equalities, consumer protection and health 
and safety at work. 
c) Additional powers. These concern areas that would ensure consistency with the full 
requirements of the single market. This would concern notably the free movement of people, 
and therefore for immigration to become a devolved competence. The paper cites the cases 
of Canada and Australia as examples where the provinces or states have certain competences 
to detail their own immigration policies. To the argument from London that Scotland could 
become a transit point for immigrants to defeat the immigration restrictions of the rest of the 
UK, it is pointed out that the UK Prime Minister has said that controls are likely to be based on 
checks at places of employment, rather than at the frontier. In addition the paper cites a long 
list of further single market competences, including energy regulation, financial services, 
telecommunications, etc.  
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Scotland already has many attributes of a state in a federation. The above scenario is one in which 
many further powers would be attributed to it. Voices in London may decry this as a ‘power grab’. But 
none of this would be happening without Brexit.  
Assessment 
Six months after the June 24th referendum, London still cannot say what it wants, and indeed does not 
yet seem to know what it wants in any operationally defined terms. London’s silence is itself 
understandable, since it becomes increasingly clear that there is no good Brexit option – only 
alternative menus of disadvantages.  
Scotland, on the other hand, says what it wants. In the event of Brexit, its first preference is for the 
whole UK to remain both in the single market (EEA) and customs union. This is a coherent statement 
by a government that regrets Brexit but seeks damage minimisation. The proposition is clear and 
operationally feasible. If London decides that it does not want that, it takes this position in disregard 
for Scotland’s wishes.  
In this case, as a second-best Brexit option, Scotland advocates a complex legal arrangement allowing 
it to remain in the single market, while also remaining in the UK, with the rest of the UK leaving the 
single market. The legal feasibility and economic practicality of this arrangement will doubtless be 
subject to much controversy and argument in London and Brussels. However, the clearest and most 
politically sensitive proposition, namely that competence for immigration would be devolved to 
Scotland to allow continued free movement of people there, is a serious proposition that cannot be 
rejected out of hand on objective grounds.  
Both options present serious political or technical complications, to say the least. However, London 
must judge its response with a fuller awareness of the consequences than is characteristic of much 
current debate. If London’s reply were to be simply ‘no and no’, it would risk adding a fresh momentum 
in favour of Scotland’s independence and thus towards disintegration of the UK itself and to whatever 
other calamities that Brexit seems destined to deliver. As a first reaction, Theresa May is reported1 to 
reject the idea of ‘differential relationships’, and to consider that the proposals may be ‘impractical’. 
                                                          
1 See “British PM rebukes Scottish single market plans”, EU Observer, 21 December 2016. 
